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HOSS HARDY, Appellant, v. ;JAMES IJESI1£E VIAI1 et al.,
Hespondents.
[la, lb] Malicious Prosecution-Nature of Original Proceedin.gs.Generally, a malicious prosecution action may be founded on
a proceeding before an administrative body; one who initiates
or procures the initiation of civil proceedings against another
before an administrative board which has power to take action
adversely affecting the legally protected interests of the other
is subject to liability for any special harm caused thereby, if
the proceedings are initiated without probable cause to believe
that the charge or claim on which the proceedings are based
is well founded, and primarily for a purpose other than that of
securing appropriate action by the board, and if the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom
they are brought.
[2] !d.-Nature of Original Proceedings.-It makes little difference
to a person whether his rights are violated by the institution
of proceedings before a court or an administrative body, and
his right of redress for malicious conduct should not depend
on the form of the proceeding by which the injury is inflicted.
[Sa, 3b] !d.-Nature of Original Proceedings.-The rule that an
action for malicious prosecution may be founded on the institution of a proceeding before an administrative agency is
not dependent on the type of judicial review which is allowed
after decision of the administrative agency involved; in considering the availability of an action for malicious prosecution,
no distinction should be made between proceedings commenced
before agencies having adjudicatory powers and those commenced before agencies whose findings of fact are subject to
trial de novo in a judicial proceeding. (Disapproving Vargas
v. Giacosa, 121 Cal.App.2d 521 [263 P.2d 840]; Lorber v.
Stor1·ow, 22 Cal.App.2d 25 [70 P.2d 513); Hayashida v. Kakimoto, 132 Cal.App. 743 [23 P.2d 311]; and Gosulich v. Stempel,
81 Cal.App. 278 [253 P. 344].)
[ 4] Civil Service-Boards and Commissions-Judicial Review.[1] Malicious prosecution predicated on prosecution, institution
or instigation of administrative proceeding, note, 143 A.L.R. 157.
See Cal.Jur.2d, Malicious Prosecution, § 10; Am.Jur., Malicious
Prosecution, § 7 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Malicious Prosecution, § 6; [ 4) Civil
Service, § 13; [5, 6] Public Officers, § 61; [7, 8] Universities and
Colleges, § 7; [9] Malicious Prosecution, § 4; [10] Malicious Prosecution, § 32.
48 C.2d-19
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The State Personnel Board has adjudicatory powers, and its
findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
Public Officers-Civil Liability-Immunity.-The rule of absolute immunity of public officers from civil liability for malicious prosecution, notwithstanding malice or other sinister
motive, is not restricted to public officers who institute or
take part in criminal actions, but extends to all executive
public officers when performing within the scope of their power
acts which require the exercise of discretion or judgment.
!d.-Civil Liability-Immunity.-What is meant by saying
that an officer must be acting within his power to be entitled
to immunity from liability for malicious prosecution cannot
be more than that the occasion must be such as would have
justified the act, if he had been using his power for any of the
purposes on whose account it was vested in him.
Universities and College&-Liability of Offi.cer&-Immunity,The alleged purpose of certain school officers of a state college
in conspiring with and aiding nonschool persons in making affidavits leading to the dismissal of a professor from his employment comes within the scope of the official duties of the school
officers and within the rule of immunity from liability; the
policy on which such rule is based would be defeated if it were
held that whenever an officer uses his office for a personal
motive not connected with the public good he acts outside his
power.
!d.-Liability of Officers-Immunity.-The fact that certain
school officers of a state college sought to procure the dismissal of a professor by acting in concert with other persons
cannot properly be treated as destroying the immunity from
liability which they would have if each of them had acted
individually and independently of any other person to secure
the same result; the underlying theory of absolute immunity is
equally applicable whether the employee acts by himself or
with others who are not immune.
Malicious Prosecution-By and Against Whom Action Maintainable.-In an action against certain school officers of a
state college and other persons for maliciously and without
probable cause having conspired to accuse a professor falsely
of gross immorality and unprofessional conduct which resulted
in his dismissal from his college position, a judgment in favor
of the school defendants on sustaining their demurrer should
be affirmed since they come within the protection of the rule of
immunity from civil liability, but the alleged facts do not
entitle a nonschool defendant to immunity from liability, and

[ 5] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, § 88; Am.Jur., Public Officers,
§§ 289.5, 303 et seq.
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a judgment in his favor on sustaining his demurrer, should be
reversed.
[10] Id.-Pleading.-Iu an action against certain school officers of
a state college and against other persons for maliciously and
without probable cause having conspired to accuse a professor falsely of gross immorality and unprofessional conduet which resulted in his dismissal from his college position,
though it was not specifically alleged that one nonschool dt>fendant knew or reasonably should have known that the affidavits making such charges were false, where it was alleged
that he acted without probable cause in conspiring to make
false charges against the professor and that the making of
such charges was in pursuance of the conspiracy, this satisfied
the usual rule that a general averment of want of probable
cause is sufficient and that it is unnecessary to add a statt>ment of facts which tend to prove the averment, such as
knowledge of falsity.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of lJos
Angeles County. Beach Vasey, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Action for malicious prosecution. Judgment for defendant
Vial reversed; judgment for other defendants affirmed.
Desmond & Desmond and Walter Desmond for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Lee B. Stanton,
Depnty Attorney General, and George H. Chula, for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.--Plaintiff was discharged from his employment as a professor at Long Beach State College as the result
of charges made by defendants, and, after reinstatement to
his position by the State Personnel Board, he commenced this
action for damages for malicious prosecution. He named as
defendants seven persons, hereafter referred to as the school
defendants, \vho are officials of the college or of the state
Department of Education, and three persons, Vial, Pond, and
Egolf, who apparently have no connection with the college or
the department.* General demurrers of Vial and the school
*Defendant Peterson is president of the college, defendants Rhodes
and Bryant are deans, and defendant J'ohnson is head of the division
of the college in which plaintiff is employed. Defendant Roy E. Simpson is Director of Education of the State of California, defendant Vasche
is assistant director of edueation of the Department of Education in
charge of state colleges, and defendant Dresser is a special agent and
field representative of the department.
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defendants were sustained without leave to amend, and plaintiff has appealed from the ensuing judgments. 'l'he remaining
two defendants are not involved on this appeal.
The allegations of the complaint may be summarized as
follows: Defendants wrongfully, maliciously and without
probable cause conspired to accuse plaintiff falsely of gross
immorality and unprofessional conduct during the period of
his emplo:yment for the purpose of procuring his dismissal.
In pursuance of the conspiracy, defendants Vial, Pond, and
Egolf, aided and abetted by the other defendants, made and
filed with the college affidavits which charged plaintiff falsely
with the commission of acts of a base and depraved nature.
By reason of the acts alleged in the affidavits plaintiff was
dismissed from his employment at the college effective March
27, 1953. After a hearing the State Personnel Board found
that the charges were untrue and that the grounds for the
dismissal were not sustained by the evidence. The board revoked the dismissal and ordered defendant Simpson to return
plaintiff to his position at the college. No review of the
board's decision was sought, and plaintiff was returned to his
position.
[la] It is the general rule that a malicious prosecution
action may be founded upon a proceeding before an administrative body. Section 680 of the Restatement of 'l'orts declares: ''One who initiates or procures the initiation of civil
proceedings against another before an administrative board
which has power to take action adversely affecting the legally
protected interests of the other, is subject to liability for any
special harm cau:;;ed thereby, if (a) the proceedings are
initiated (i) without probable cause to believe that the charge
or claim on which the proceedings are based is well founded,
and (ii) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing
appropriate action by the board, and (b) the proceedings have
terminated in favor of the person against whom they are
brought." (In accord, Melvin v. Pence, 130 F.2d 423, 425
et seq. [76 App.D.O. 154, 143 A.L.R. 149] ; National Surety
Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145, 148; Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v.
Rivers, 209 Ga. 98 [70 S.E.2d 734, 740-741]; Rivers v. Dixie
Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga.App. 131 [76 S.E.2d 229, 233] ;
Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley F'arrns, 19 N.J. 552 [117
A.2d 889, 895-896] ; see Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280 [113
A.2d 671, 673-674, 52 A.L.R.2d 1208], cert. den. 350 U.S. 887
[76 S.Ot. 141, 100 L.Ed. 782]; 143 A.L.R. 157.)
The theory of these authorities is that the same harmful
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consequences may result from the malicious institution of
administrative proceedings as from judicial proceedings maliciously begun, whether criminal or civil in nature. [2] As
pointed out in the Melvin case, 130 F.2d 423, 426 [76 App.
D.C. 154, 143 A.L.R. 149], it makes little difference to a
person whether his rights are violated by the institution of
proceedings before a court or before an administrative body,
and his right to redress for malicious conduct should not depend upon the form of the proceeding by which the injury is
inflicted. The eourt further stated: "The administrative
process is also a legal process, and its abuse in the same way
with the same injury should receive the same penalty . . . .
When private as well as public rights more and more are
coming to be determined by administrative proceedings, it
would be anomalous to have one rule for them and another
for the courts in respect to redress for abuse of their powers
and processes." (130 F.2d at pp. 426, 427.)
[lb] We adopt the rule set forth in section 680 of the
Restatement of Torts and hold that an action for malicious
prosecution may be founded upon the institution of a proceeding before an administrative agency. [3a] This rule is in
no way dependent upon the type of judicial review which is
allowed after decision of the administrative agency involved,
and we do not agree with defendants' contention that plaintiff
cannot maintain this action because the State Personnel Board
assertedly cannot exercise adjudicatory powers and has no
authority to make a final determination of a question of fact.
In considering the availability of an action for malicious
prosecution, no distinction should be made between proceedings commenced before agencies having adjudicatory powers
and those commenced before agencies whose findings of fact
are subject to trial de novo in a judicial proceeding. Such a
distinction is unsound in principle and if adopted would result
in unnecessary complexity and confusion. [4] Moreover, it
is settled that the State Personnel Board has adjudicatory
powers, and its findings of fact will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. (Shepherd v. State Personnel
Board, ante, pp. 41,46-48 [307 P.2d 4].)
[3b] The cases of Vargas v. Giacosa, 121 Cal.App.2d 521
r263 P.2d 840], Lorber v. Sto17ow, 22 Cal.App.2d 25 [70 P.2d
513], Hayashida v. Kakimoto, 132 Cal.App. 743 [23 P.2d 311],
and Cosulich v. Stempel, 81 Cal.App. 278 [253 P. 344], which,
without mentioning the authorities listed above or their
reasoning, reached a contrary conclusion, are disapproved in-
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sofar as they are in conflict with the views expressed in this
opinion.
The seven school defendants contend that the judgment
should be affirmed because, they assert, they are immune from
civil liability. In White v. Towers, 37 Oal.2d 727 [235 P.2d
209, 28 A.L.R.2d 636], we held that an investigator for the
State Fish and Game Commission, who had the duty to investigate crime and to institute criminal proceedings, was immune
from civil liability for the malicious prosecution of a criminal
action against the plaintiff. A similar conclusion was reached
in Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Oal.2d 315 [239 P.2d 876], which
involved deputy sheriffs and city policem,~n. [5] The rnle
of absolute immunity, notwithstanding malice or other sinister
motive, is not restricted to public officers who institute or
take part in criminal actions. First recognized for the protection of judges (Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335 [20
L.Ed. 646]), it has been extended by the federal decisions to
all executive public officers when performing within the scope
of their power acts which require the exercise of discretion or
judgment. (Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [16 S.Ot. 631, 40
L.Ed. 780] ; Standard Nut Mat·garine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d
557; United States, to Use of Parravicino v. B,-unswick, 69
F.2d 383; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 [73 App.D.C. 292];
FarT v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413; De ATnand v. Ainsworth,
24 App.D.C. 167 [5 L.R.A.N.S. 163]; see Papagianalcis v. The
Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-262.) In this state Downer v. Lent,
6 Cal. 94 [95 Am.Dec. 489], and Oppenheimer Y. Arnold, 9H
Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [222 P.2d 940], reeognize the same wide
immunity. (Of. also W·ilson v. Sharp, 42 Cal.2d ()7;3, ti79 [268
P.2d 1062].)
The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is
well stated by Judge Learned Hand in GregoiTe v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581, as follows: "It does indeed go without saying
that an official, who is in faet guilty of using his powers to
vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive
not connected with the public good, should not escape liability
for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in
practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so
is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well
founded until the ease has been tried, and that to submit all
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of
a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
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irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
Again and again the public interest calls for action which
may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which
an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a
jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public offlcers who have been truant to their duties; but
that is quite another matter from exposing such as have
been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from
their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found
in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative.
In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave
unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation.''
The seven school defendants occupied positions which would
ordinarily embrace duties relating to the investigation of
eharges whieh could lead to the discipline or dismissal of persons such as plaintiff, and it is not claimed that the school
defendants were without authority to investigate and proseeute eharges made against employees. Plaintiff contends,
however, that the school defendants are not entitled to the
protection of the immunity rule because they assertedly acted
beyond the scope of their employment when they conspired
with the nonschool defendants and aided them in making and
filing affidavits containing false charges. [6] It should be
noted in this connection that "\Vhat is meant by saying that
the officer must be acting within his power [to be entitled to
immunity] cannot be more than that the occasion must be
such as would have justified the act, if he had been using his
power for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested
in him." ( Gregoi1·e v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d at p. 581.) [7] The
alleged purpose of the conspiracy, and, accordingly, the purpose of the school defendants in aiding the nonschool defendants in making the affidavits, was to accomplish the dismissal
of plaintiff from his employment. This purpose, of course,
was clearly within the scope of the official duties of the school
defendants and within the protection of the immunity rule.
The policy on which the rule is based would be defeated if it
were held that whenever an officer uses his office for a personal motive not eonnected with the public good he acts outside his power.
[8] The fact that the school defendants sought to attain
their objective by acting in concert with other persons cannot
properly be treated as destroying the immunity which they
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would have if each of them had acted individually and independently of any other person to secure the same result. The
underlying theory of absolute immunity is equally applicable
whether the employee acts by himself or ·with others who are
not immune. (Cf. White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal.App.2d 307,
310 et seq. [73 P.2d 254] [public officers treated as acting in
their official capacities even though they acted in concert with
other persons]; Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406-407 [56
A.L.R. 1239]; IIoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224 [28 N.W.
2d 780, 790, 173 A.L.R. 819]; Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43
[295 N.W. 299, 301-302] .) [9] Since the seven sehool defendants have immunity, the judgment in their favor must be
affirmed.
The complaint does not allege faets which would entitle Vial
to immunity, and we are of the view that a cause of action is
stated against him. [10] While it is not specifically alleged
that Vial knew or reasonably should have known that the
affidavits were false, it is alleged that he acted without probable cause in conspiring to make false charges against plaintiff and that the making of such charges was in pursuance
of the conspiracy. This meets the usual rule that a general
averment of want of probable cause is sufficient and that it is
unnecessary to add a statement of facts which tend to prove
the averment, such as knowledge of falsity. (See P~llvennacher
v. Los Angeles Coordinating Committee, 61 Cal.App.2d 704,
707 [143 P.2d 974]; Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal.App.2d 706,
710 [83 P.2d 523]; 2 Witkin, California Procedure (1954)
1357; 54 C.J.S. 1043; 14 A.L.R.2d 264, 282.)
The judgment in favor of Vial is reversed. The judgment
in favor of the other respondents is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J., Dissenting and Concurring.-! dissent.
I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which
holds that an action for malicious prosecution may be founded
upon the institution of a proceeding before an administrative
agency, and that the judgment in favor of Vial, a nonschool
defendant, should be reversed.
I cannot agree with that portion of the opinion which holds
that the seven school defendants are entitled to hide behind
the outmoded cloak of immunity from civil liability. Furthermore this is an appeal from a judgment entered upon the
sustaining of a demurrer to a complaint without leave to
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amend. "['I'] he only issue involved in a demurrer hearing
. . . lis] whether the eomplaillt, as it stands, unconnected with
<•xtraueous matters, states a eause of action." (Griffith v.
Department of Public Works, 141 Cal.App.2d 876, 381 [296
P.2d 838] .) 'l'he rule is well established that the allegations
of the complaint must be taken as true. The question is then
one of law only and if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action
on any theory he is entitled to a trial on the factual issues
involved.
Plaintiff's complaint charged that the 10 defendants, seven
of whom were school officials,* had engaged in a conspiracy
for the purpose of procuring his dismissal from his employment; that in aid of such conspiracy the school defendants
aided and abetted the nonschool defendants in preparing
affidavits falsely accusing plaintiff of certain vile and depraved
acts. Plaintiff also alleged that because of these affidavits and
the acts constituting the conspiracy, he was dismissed from
his employment; that after a hearing it was unanimously
found by the State Personnel Board that the charges against
plaintiff were untnw. Plaintiff also sets forth in detail the
damages suffered by him as a result of the charges made by
the defendants. Plaintiff has set forth all the necessary elements of an action for malicious prosecution.
The following statement from the majority opinion is clearly
without basis in fact or in law: '' 'l'he alleged purpose of the
conspiracy, and, accordingly, the pnrpose of the school defendants in aiding the nonschool defendants in making the affidavits, was to accomplish the dismissal of plaintiff frorn his
employment. This purpose, of eottrse, was clearly within the
scope of the official duties of the school defendants and within
the protection of the immunity rule." (Emphasis added.)
It will be recalled that plaintiff charged that the conspiracy
was malicious; that defendants agreed between themselves to
falsely charge plaintiff with vile and depraved acts to procure
his dismissal. The majority opinion informs us, however, that
"The policy on which the rule [immunity from civil liability]
is based would be defeated if it were held that whenever an
officer uses his office for a personal motive not connected with
the public good he acts outside his power." (Emphasis added.)
It will also be recalled that three of the defendants were not
school or department personnel. The majority, however, states
that this does not remove the protective "immunity" from
*'l'wo of the nonschool defendants are not involved on this appeal.
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the school defendants. It is difficult for me to imagine how
public officials acting with malice aforethought and swearing
to falsehoods in conspiracy with outsiders can possibly be considered as acting within the "scope of their authority." 'rhe
undeniable scope of the authority of school officials is to protect students from those found unfit to teach by reason of lack
of ability or immoral character. The scope of authority of such
school officials is most certainly not to procure the dismissal
of teachers by entering into a conspiracy with outsiders to
defame and assassinate a teacher's character without justification or probable cause for believing the defamatory remarks
to be true. The question of probable cause cannot be tried on
a demurrer hearing inasmuch as for the purpose of determining the sustainability of the demurrer every single allegation
of plaintiff's complaint must be taken as tnw. Aside from the
doctrine of governmental immunity, which I will hereinafter
discuss, plaintiff was entitled to a trial on the merits since
governmental immunity does not apply when the official is
acting outside the scope of his authority. A majority of this
court held, in White v. Towers, 37 Oal.2d 727, 733 [235 P.2d
209, 28 A.L.R.2d 636],* that "It is well established that a
public officer is liable for injuries caused by acts done outside
the scope of his authority." In cases of this character liability
for damages cannot be made to rest on mere conspiracy. The
gravamen of the action is the malicious prosectdion of the
criminal charge without probable cause. (Dowdell v. Carpy,
129 Cal. 168,171 [61 P. 948]; Andrews v. Young, 21 Cal.App.
2d 523 [69 P.2d 891] .) If any public official, under the guise
of investigation, may conspire with persons having no official
standing to injure others by maliciously and falsely accusing
them of base and vile conduct and in so doing escape all
liability, it would appear to me that such a result would lead
to more, rather than less, dishonesty on the part of public
officials. In the other cases in which I have dissented (White
v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 734 [235 P.2d 209, 28 A.L.R.2d 636] ;
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Oal.2d 315, 324 [239 P.2d 876] ;
Talley v. Northern San Diego Cot~nty Hospital Dist., 41 Cal.2d
33, 41 [257 P.2d 22] ; Turner v. Mellon, 41 Oal.2d 45, 49 [257
P.2d 15] ; Peterson v. Robison, 43 Cal.2d 690, 698 [277 P.2d
19] ; dissenting opinion on denial of hearing, Madison v. City
&; County of San Francisco, 106 Oal.App.2d 232 [234 P.2d
995, 236 P.2d 141]) a majority of this court had not reached
the peak of injustice that it has reached in the case at bar.
*(Which I believe was incorrectly decided.)
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In my dissent in the Talley case (supra, p. 43) I pointed
out that "'l'he government obviously cannot insure the citizen
against all defects and errors in administration, but there is
no reason why the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully
sustained by the citizen, those arising from the torts [in this
instance a malicious one] of governmental officers and employees, should be allowed to rest at the door of the unfortttnate citizen alone. The entire doctrine of governmental immunity rests upon a rotten foundation, and professors, writers
and liberal-minded judges are of the view that it should be
placed in the judicial garbage can where it belongs. (See
Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85 [136 P.2d 480] ; 75
A.L.R. 1196; Brooklyn Law Review, April, 1932, 'Shmild the
Liability of il'hmicipalities in 'I'ort be Extended to Include Injnry and Damage Caused in the Negligent Performance of a
Governmental Function?'; 120 A.L.R. 1376; 54 Harv.L.Rev.,
pp. 437-462, 'Municipal 'I'ort Liability in Operation'.)" I
also pointed out that I had thought when People v. Superior
Court, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919], was
decided in 1947, that we had begun to revamp our ideas. It
was there said that ''The considerations of an asserted subversion of public interests by embarrassments, difficulties and
losses, which developed the doctrine of nonliability of the
sovereign in former times, are no longer persuasive in relation to an industrial or business enterprise which by itself
may be looked to for the dil';eharge of all appropriate demands
and expenses growing out of operation." A majority of this
eourt has gone to greater lengths here in sustaining the outmoded doctrine than ever before. If the archaic doctrine of
governmental immunity were annihilated once and for all
by this court, situations such as we have here where, according to the allegations of the complaint, dishonest public officials conspired with private persons would become nonexistent.
The very thought that they might be found guilty of malicious
prosecution would be a deterrent to conduct not based on
probable eause.
I would reverse the judgment in favor of all defendants.

